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Abstract
Building on self-professed perspectival approaches to both scientific knowledge and
causation, I explore the potentially radical suggestion that perspectivalism can be ex-
tended to account for a type of objectivity in science. Motivated by recent claims from
quantum foundations that quantum mechanics must admit the possibility of observer-
dependent facts, I develop the notion of ‘perspectival objectivity’, and suggest that an
easier pill to swallow, philosophically speaking, than observer-dependency is perspective-
dependency, allowing for a notion of observer-independence indexed to an agent perspec-
tive. Working through the case studies of colour perception and causal perspectivalism, I
identify two places within which I claim perspectival objectivity is already employed, and
make the connection to quantum mechanics through Bohr’s philosophy of quantum theory.
I contend that perspectival objectivity can ensure, despite the possibility of perspective-
dependent scientific facts, the objectivity of scientific inquiry.
1 Introduction
In his book “Scientific Perspectivism”, Giere (2006) argues in favour of a view he calls ‘per-
spectival realism’. According to this view, both the claim that science delivers objectively true
representations of reality, and the counterclaim that scientific reality is constructed—and ul-
timately constituted—by the fruits of human scientific activity, are rejected. Instead, Giere
explicates his position as one that accepts both that there are mind-independent elements to
physical reality and that scientific knowledge is historically and culturally situated in scientific
practice: it is only in the context of some specific (usually highly confirmed) physical theory
that reality appears to be a particular way. This position is considered ‘perspectival’ on account
of this ‘situatedness’—in the parlance of sociological approaches to the philosophy of science,
the concept of situatedness recognises that agents (knowers) are necessarily embedded within a
social context or environment (Anderson, 2019). This view thus recognises the fundamental fact
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that scientific knowledge is always mediated through the lens of a scientific theory, while avoid-
ing the inherent relativism that often follows from some sociological approaches to science. As
Massimi (2018a, p.343) puts it, a scientific perspective refers “to the actual. . . scientific practice
of any real scientific community at any given historical time” (where a scientific practice is un-
derstood to be constituted by scientific knowledge claims, and the scientific resources to ensure
those claims are reliable and justified). Thus, over time, as the scientific practice of particular
scientific communities evolves, so too does the scientific perspective of those communities, and
so too their scientific claims about reality.
In the edited collection “Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality” (Price and
Corry, 2007), Price (2007) (with later developments by Ismael (2016)) develops a view he
calls ‘causal perspectivalism’. According to this view, the temporal asymmetry of cause and
effect is reduced to the temporal bias of an agent’s epistemic access to its environment; or,
as Price (2007, p.263) puts it, it is reduced to the “agent’s perspective”. The use of the term
‘perspectival’ in this context is again tied to the situatedness of agents, in the sense that it is
the embedding of an agent in a particular context that gives rise to the possibility of alternative
perspectives. Although, according to causal perspectivalism, it is the epistemic consequences
of the fact that agents are embedded within a (necessarily inescapable) environment with a
particular temporal direction that is significant here, rather than the epistemic consequences
of a particular social or cultural embedding, as above.
In addition to these two examples of this use of the label perspectival, the term has been
employed with increasing frequency in recent years especially (with a few earlier examples). As
Cret¸u (in press) points out, perspectivalism “has been advocated in connection to. . . explanation
(Craver, 2013; Dewhurst, 2018; Ka¨stner, 2018; Winning, 2018), time (Rovelli, 2017; Torrengo,
2017; Baron and Evans, in press), meta-ethics (Schafer, 2014), peer disagreement (Kvanvig,
2013), justification (Sosa, 1991; Rosenberg, 2002), [and] contextualism and relativism in phi-
losophy of language (Bach, 2011)”. My interest in this work is to explore the possibility of
the potentially radical suggestion that perspectivalism can be extended to account for a type
of objectivity, a type of observer-independence, in science, but where facts about scientifically
modelled objects are nonetheless indexed to an observer perspective. My motivation is a recent
set of claims from quantum foundations that quantum mechanics rules out the possibility of
“observer-independent facts”.
1.1 No-go theorems for observer-independent facts
Following the argument of Frauchiger and Renner (2018), that claims an incompatibility be-
tween the universal validity of quantum theory and the assumption that particular sets of
measurements have jointly definite outcomes, Brukner (2018) argues that observer-independent
facts are in fact inconsistent with the universal validity of quantum theory. Subsequent work due
to Bong et al. (2019), following Healey’s (2018) review of both Brukner (2018) and Frauchiger
and Renner (2018), criticises the strength of Brukner’s assumptions and proves a stronger
theorem containing a weaker set of assumptions than Brukner’s theorem. Their theorem estab-
lishes that observer-independent facts are incompatible with the widely accepted assumptions
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of ‘locality’ (the choice of the measurement settings of one observer has no influence on the
outcomes of the other distant observers) and ‘free choice’ (the choice of measurement settings
is statistically independent from the rest of the experiment), without relying on assumptions
specific to quantum theory, and so independently of the universality of quantum mechanics.1
Specific details of this debate aside, the central claim emanating from this body of research
is that accepting the assumptions of locality and free choice (arguments against which can be
motivated by other more famous no-go theorems (Bell, 1964, 1966)), there is a very real possi-
bility of observer-dependent facts. That is, in certain scenarios there is no possibility of jointly
assigning truth values to the propositions about observed outcomes of different observers.
I contend that this claim requires increased attention. To begin with, none of Frauchiger
and Renner (2018), Brukner (2018), nor Bong et al. (2019) attempt to explain in any great de-
tail what exactly is meant by observer-dependent facts. While there is discussion in each work
regarding various interpretations of quantum theory, and a mention that relational quantum me-
chanics, quantum Bayesianism, and neo-Copenhagen interpretations to varying degrees already
reject observer-independent facts, there is no accompanying discussion concerning what this is
supposed to mean philosophically. Subsequently, one might take the admission of observer de-
pendency as licensing pernicious anthropocentrism in our account of reality: pernicious, since
observer dependency might preclude the possibility that observers agree about some facts of
reality, thereby precluding the possibility of objective scientific inquiry. In this context, Healey
(2018, p.1585), in the final words of his critique of Brukner (2018) and Frauchiger and Renner
(2018), diagnoses the consequences for objectivity as a possible place to focus philosophical
attention when he concludes:
This result prompts further reflection on how to understand quantum theory. . . The arguments
considered in this paper give us no reason to doubt the sincerity or truth of experimenters’
reports of definite, physical outcomes. But I think [they] should make us reconsider the extent
and nature of their objectivity.
The present work is a response to this prescription for further critique: it contains an examina-
tion of one possible, albeit radical, way to consider the nature of the objectivity of the claims
made by experimenters when observing quantum systems. Appropriating the notion of per-
spective from the ‘scientific perspectivism’ and ‘causal perspectivalism’ research programmes, I
set out to develop a position that I call ‘perspectival objectivity’. In short, I suggest that these
no-go theorems, rather than demonstrating the possibility of observer-dependent facts, would
be better understood as demonstrating the possibility of perspective-dependent facts, leaving
untouched the notion of observer-independence—that is, objectivity—indexed to a perspective.
1.2 Main claims and outline of the paper
As mentioned above, a perspective refers to the practical, epistemological, and/or theoretical
constraints placed by a context or environment on an agent embedded within that context
1Bong et al. propose an experimental arrangement to test their theorem, wherein “a photon’s path is deemed
an observer”, and this experiment has been completed, and Bong et al.’s result verified, by Proietti et al. (2019).
However, it is controversial whether a photon can be deemed an observer is such a way. This issue is beyond
the scope of the present work.
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or environment. According to scientific perspectivism, in the context of a particular scientific
tradition, the way the world appears to be is constrained by the historical and cultural environ-
ment in which that scientific tradition is situated. According to causal perspectivalism, given
that we are agents embedded in an environment with a particular temporal direction, the causal
direction between causally related events is constrained by the temporally directed epistemic
environment (that is, that we have knowledge of the past but not of the future) in which we
are situated. It is worth emphasising that the interactive nature of the agent-embedded-in-an-
environment is significant to this notion of perspective, in contrast to a common metaphorical
understanding of perspective as simply a passive point of view, or window on the world. To this
end, any time that an embedded agent delineates an object (a system/environment split), or
the subsequent interaction between the agent and the object (system/apparatus/environment
split), this necessarily characterises a perspective.2 Thus, according to these traditions, obser-
vation cannot be detached from a perspective.
Relatedly, and a point on which I wish to expand below, Giere (2006, p.14) argues that
scientific instruments are perspectival, in two senses:
First. . . instruments are sensitive only to a particular kind of input. They are, so to speak,
blind to everything else. Second, no instrument is perfectly transparent. That is, the output
is a function of both the input and the internal constitution of the instrument.
In the first sense, Giere identifies that instruments take as input only some subset of variables,
or perhaps a limited range of values for some subset of variables, that we take to characterise
some system, and are silent concerning the remaining complete set of variables. In the second
sense, Giere recognises that instruments to some extent ‘process’ the input to the instrument,
such that the output of the application of an instrument is typical to that instrument. In the
background of these considerations for Giere is the fact that instruments are theory-laden, and
so are perspectival in a broader scientific sense, also.
I wish to push this idea that scientific instruments are perspectival to a more extreme
position, taking a cue from causal perspectivalism. When an embedded agent delineates system
and environment, part of this delineation is an identification of the variables that are taken
to characterise the system, with other variables redundant to that characterisation relegated
to the environment. But the variables of interest to an embedded agent for characterising a
system are a function of the capabilities of that agent to interact with the system. For the same
reason that Giere claims to make instruments perspectival—that instruments are sensitive to
only some subset of variables that might characterise a system—so too does it seem that our
own interaction with a system is equally perspectival: we are sensitive to only a certain set
of variables, namely, ones that can be detected by sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste.3 We
are blind to all other variables that could characterise the system. To some extent this is a
trivial observation, in the sense that we cannot model undetectable properties or behaviour of
2Often, this sort of delineation is largely a pragmatic decision made by scientific agents during the modelling
process that is dependent upon the utility it might serve for scientific purposes (that is, prediction or information
gathering).
3And these variables within a limited range of values, too: only a limited range of frequencies of electromag-
netic radiation; a limited range of frequencies of pressure waves in the air; a limited range of pressures on our
skin; and a limited set of molecular compounds on the membranes and receptors in our nose and tongue.
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a system in terms of undetectable variables, but this consideration also brings to light a deeper
perspective from which we model reality. Just like the historically and culturally situated
scientific practice defines a perspective, and our epistemic access to our temporally directed
environment defines a perspective, so too does our constrained idiosyncratic capabilities to
interact with, and model, reality define a perspective.
While it is certainly true that we can extend the range of values for each of the variables
in the set to which we are sensitive using advanced scientific instruments, since the output
of our instruments is useless unless it is itself detectable by us, the usefulness of scientific
instruments is likewise limited to processing any input to output into the same set of variables
circumscribed by the human agent perspective. As Giere (2006, p.126) notes, “an observer,
whether a human or an instrument, can interact with an object only from the observer’s own
particular perspective”. Again, it is trivial to consider that we cannot model properties or
behaviour of a system in terms of undetectable outputs from the interaction of an instrument
with the system.
Furthermore, just like our epistemic access to our temporally directed environment is in-
escapable for embedded agents such as ourselves, so too is our constrained interaction capa-
bilities. According to causal perspectivalism, the fact that all human agents are embedded
in the same temporally directed environment permits intersubjective agreement between hu-
man agents concerning the attribution of directed causal relations between events. Since this
temporally embedded perspective is inescapable, this intersubjectivity lends itself to a kind of
objectivity or observer-independence, albeit an ‘intersubjective objectivity’ (Giere, 2006, p.13);
that is, since every possible observer is equally temporally embedded, each observer attributes
the same directed causal relations between events, with this attribution indexed to the perspec-
tive of the temporally embedded agent. I take the term perspectival objectivity to refer to this
kind of intersubjective objectivity indexed to a particular agent perspective. That is, perspecti-
val objectivity refers to a scenario in which some feature of the world is in part a function of the
agent perspective while at the same time, given such a perspective that is inescapably shared
between similar agents, there is an (intersubjectively) objective fact of the matter concerning
that feature.4 I argue that colour perception (§2.1) and causal perspectivalism (§2.2) can be
understood as examples of perspectival objectivity. One of the main claims of this paper is
that the perspective characterised by our constrained interaction capabilities—an inescapable
condition of worldly-directed human agency—is also an example of perspectival objectivity, and
that this can underpin the possibility of objective scientific inquiry in the face of the prospect
of observer-dependent facts.5
4There is a term employed in probability theory to describe probabilities that are a function of both the
worldly circumstances and a (potentially hypothetical) agent’s knowledge of those circumstances: an ‘objective
epistemic’ probability is epistemic since it is a measure of an agent’s degree of reasonableness of belief, and it is
objective because it is independent of the beliefs of any particular agent (Achinstein, 2001, p.170). An objective
epistemic probability is thus agent-independent indexed to an epistemic perspective. I take such probabilities
to express a similar sentiment to perspectival objectivity.
5There are other types of perspectives that do not support necessary intersubjective agreement across ob-
servers. For instance, the regular theoretical and paradigmatic practices of a scientific agent provide a framework
within which physical phenomena can be modelled and interpreted (Massimi, 2018b), or particular personal pro-
clivities may also provide such an interpretational framework, but these sources of perspectivalism in science
are not necessarily shared intersubjectively amongst scientific agents.
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To be sure, perspectival objectivity is highly incongruous with the conception of metaphys-
ical objectivity in, say, realist approaches to scientific ontology. I make no pretence to be
contributing to any debate regarding objectivity in this strong metaphysical sense. If anything,
perspectival objectivity is a strongly qualified and attenuated sense of objectivity that I claim
is sufficient, given that our scientific practice is a purely intersubjective affair, to ensure the
objectivity of scientific inquiry; that is, to ensure that scientific inquiry is observer-independent
indexed to a perspective. What is more, I contend that this notion is thus also sufficient to
make sense of the consequences of the no-go theorems above, preferring them to be showing the
possibility of perspective-dependent facts, rather than observer-dependent facts, and I make
this case by connecting perspectival objectivity to Bohr’s philosophy of quantum theory in §3.
While this may not be the only, or indeed a necessary, reading of Bohr, the reader should keep in
mind the main motivation for this work: to put forward an albeit unorthodox interpretational
stance to attempt to make sense of the possibility presented by the no-go theorems for observer-
dependent facts in quantum theory. To this end, I am marshalling a range of philosophical and
physical positions in support. After I explore in more depth the concept of perspectival ob-
jectivity in §4, I finish in §5 with one such supporting position that is an interesting example
of the kind of perspectivalism I propose for quantum theory: a recent proposal by Karakostas
and Zafiris (2018) of a formal framework for a quantum perspective. At the very least, I take
this range of arguments to establish that this unorthodox proposal is not implausible.
2 Two case studies
Let us now consider two case studies that I take to illustrate the notion of perspectival ob-
jectivity. Both the scientific perspectivism and causal perspectivalism programmes can count
this first example, colour perception (§2.1), as a foundational example. Giere (2006, Ch.2) con-
siders colour perception to be a “prototype for a scientific perspectivism”, and the precursor
for Price’s work on causal perspectivalism (“Causation as a Secondary Quality” (Menzies and
Price, 1993)) takes the ‘objectivity’ of colour perception to be a parallel case to the ‘objectivity’
of causal relations, which will comprise our second example (§2.2). Let us here rehearse the
general outline of these accounts.
2.1 Is there colour when nobody looks?
Imagine you are standing on a deserted beach looking westward on a warm Summer’s evening.
As the sun descends towards the horizon, the sky and clouds above you begin to glow with
vibrant oranges, pinks, and reds. Now imagine a similar westward facing beach on a warm
Summer’s evening with a similar sunset in process, but this time the beach is properly deserted,
in the sense that there is no embodied human agent that is the subject of any experience of
the aforementioned sunset—perhaps this moment exists somewhere on Earth 500 million years
ago. Do the sky and clouds in this moment glow with the same vibrant oranges, pinks, and
reds? Are the colours really there? This is a well-known example, so I will not labour the point.
But the answer to whether the colours are really there depends on what we mean by ‘really
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there’. A quick detour through the human optical system and colour perception will illuminate
the issue.
The human optical system consists of three different types of specialised retinal cells at
the back of the eye, called cones, that are sensitive to three different spectral ranges, which
gives rise to trichromatic vision in humans. When stimulated by incoming light to the eye, the
cones, through a chain of chemical events, emit an electrical signal that is sent to the visual
cortex via the optic nerve, and this is then processed by the brain as a visual experience. The
combination of the three cones provides a response to the stimulus that is dependent upon the
frequency profile of the light, but this dependence is not one-to-one, rather it is many-to-one.
That is, many quite different frequency profiles can produce the same signal in the optic nerve
that is then processed in the brain to a single colour experience. Thus two ordinary objects
that are an identical shade of yellow to the human eye—say, a banana and a tea cup—might
very well have completely different surface spectral reflectance profiles, despite being identified
as identical shades according to the human optical system. In fact, the frequency profiles that
arise from the surface spectral reflectance properties of all the identically shaded yellow objects
that can be observed might only have in common that the human optical system identifies them
as the same shade of yellow (Hubel, 1988, p.165).
It is from these considerations that we can begin to answer the question concerning the
reality of the colours of the prehistoric sunset. What is really there at some point on the beach
where we would imagine ourselves to be standing is a frequency profile that is a function of, say,
the surface spectral reflectance of the clouds. But that this is orange or red is purely a function
of the human optical response to that particular frequency profile. So in part we would like to
say that there is some objective feature of the world ‘out there’, the particular frequency profile,
but in part the ascription of colour to that profile is a function of the particular perceptual
capabilities of a human agent. There is a fact of the matter in the world that, given a human
optical system and some particular frequency profile, some particular colour experience will be
had.
It should be clear that the perceptual capabilities of a human agent comprise a perspective
in the sense explicated above. The human optical system practically constrains the access
that human agents have to the environment. But it should also be clear that a crucial part
of colour perception is that there will be intersubjective agreement between agents that share
perceptual capabilities, such as human agents sharing an optical system. Thus, the colour of the
prehistoric sunset is observer-independent, and so objective, in the sense that colour ascription
is independent of any particular human agent (all human agents will ascribe to it the same
colour); but it is also observer-dependent in the sense that agents with different perceptual
capabilities may well disagree about its colour (or whether it has colour at all), and so, given
that we are taking the perceptual capabilities of an agent to comprise a perspective, we can
describe the colour of the prehistoric sunset as perspective-dependent. Thus, colour perception
can be characterised as objective indexed to a particular agent perspective, and so constitutes
an example of perspectival objectivity.
This then rehearses the case of colour perception as outlined in Giere (2006, Ch.2) and
(Menzies and Price, 1993), explicated in terms of the notion of perspectival objectivity I have
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introduced above. It is important to note, both here and below, that this notion of perspectival
objectivity detaches from human agents to a much broader notion of agency. Any type of agent
(or perhaps even universality class of agents), with any idiosyncratic perceptual capabilities,
defines a perspective, to which some observer-independent (for observers within the class of
agents) phenomena can be indexed (although it is contingent whether any such phenomenon
corresponds to, say, colour). Whether we could welcome any such class of agents into our
epistemic community will depend upon the possibility of (natural or manufactured) overlap be-
tween our respective sensory contingencies. This notion of perspectival objectivity also extends
naturally to scientific instruments, where the nature of the interaction between instrument and
system characterises a kind of ‘capability’ for the instrument, and so defines a perspective (in
the way discussed above in §1.2) to which objective phenomena can be indexed. Needless to
say, we design and engineer scientific instruments to mesh with our perceptual capabilities; I
will say more about instruments in this context in §4 below.
The case of colour perception is relatively straightforward. As a second, more nuanced,
illustrative case study, let us now consider the debate over the objectivity of causality at the
intersection of agency and interventionist accounts.
2.2 Causal perspectivalism and objectivity
It is no coincidence that causal perspectivalism is related to the previous case of colour per-
ception. Menzies and Price (1993) argue that causation should be understood as a secondary
quality much the same as colour, where our “ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct
and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents” (Menzies and
Price, 1993, p.187). The idea is that, just as the perceptual capabilities of human agents play
a crucial role in defining colour perception, so too do the intervention capabilities of human
agents play a crucial role in defining causal relations and, in particular, the asymmetry of cau-
sation. This view is known as the agency account of causation, and is a type of manipulability
or interventionist account. A traditional criticism of the agency account (one that Menzies and
Price (1993, p.198–201) address) is that the account is too anthropocentric, in the sense that,
if there were no human agents, then there would be no causal relations.
Woodward (2003) criticises the agency account (with further criticism in Woodward (2007,
2009)) for this very reason: “it leads us toward an undesirable kind of anthropomorphism or
subjectivism regarding causation” (Woodward, 2003, p.123). In contrast, Woodward develops
an interventionist account of causation with a view to establishing causation as an ‘objective’
relation. Let us briefly consider here the basic details of Woodward’s interventionist account to
get to the heart of the contention over the objectivity of causal relations. The interventionist
account (like all manipulability accounts) defines the relation between two variables X and Y
as causal if and only if there exists a possible intervention on X that changes the probability
distribution of the possible values of Y , holding fixed all other variables relevant to the system.
Such a relation is established by way of an intervention variable I that satisfies a series of
conditions that constrain the nature of the probabilistic relation between I, X and Y , and any
other relevant variables which we take to be causally related to X and Y (Woodward, 2003,
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p.98):
(i) I causes X;
(ii) I breaks the relation between X and the rest of its causes;
(iii) I is not (directly or indirectly) causally related to Y except (if at all) through X;
(iv) I is statistically independent of any variable that is both a cause of Y and is part of a
causal chain that does not include X.
The essential idea behind these conditions is to place I in total control of the value of X and
eliminate any correlations between X and Y that are not a function of the intervention on X.
According to the interventionist account, a causal relation is ‘invariant’ when the functional
relation between X and Y , Y = f(X), that establishes the causal relation holds for at least some
range of possible interventions, X = x1 . . . xn. In addition, a causal relation is ‘stable’ when
there is at least some range of background conditions under which the relation between X and
Y is causal. Both the notions of invariance and stability are relative notions: there might exist a
causal relation between X and Y under a certain range of possible interventions and background
conditions that breaks down under other possible interventions and background conditions.
Only under the appropriate domains for both interventions and background conditions where
the functional relation can be established can we claim that X causes Y ; this is because it is
only within these domains that we can think of manipulating X as an appropriate means for
manipulating Y .
Moreover, the variables upon which one might intervene must be chosen such that they are
sufficiently distinct from each other: an intervention must be ‘surgical’ so as to ensure that
the variable upon which the intervention is being made is the only variable influenced by the
intervention. An intervention is ‘fat-handed’ or confounding when it either directly affects Y , or
indirectly affects Y by affecting other variables that are not on the I−X−Y path, in addition
to affecting Y through X. In a similar vein, for a given set of functional relations between a set
of variables to correctly represent the causal facts concerning some system, the interventionist
account requires that the functional relations are ‘modular’; that is, an intervention I on some
variable X does not alter the functional relation between the putative effect Y and any of its
causes that are not on a directed path from X to Y (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p.543).
Modularity requires that some functional relation is invariant and stable over some range of
interventions and background conditions (and thus is also a relative notion), and any other
functional relations in the system remain unchanged when an intervention is carried out. This
notion captures the idea of a system being constituted by distinct causal mechanisms.
Significantly, the invariance, stability, and modularity of a set of functional relations relative
to a range of interventions and background conditions is connected to the idea that the level of
detail or generality of the variables that we take to characterise these functional relations—the
‘level of grain’—in a sense needs to be stipulated. So long as we stipulate a level of grain for
the variables and relations of a system such that (i) we are able to intervene on the system
as per the above criteria, (ii) the functional relations between the variables are sufficiently
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modular, and (iii) there are appropriate ranges of invariance and stability under which the
functional relations hold, then we can take the model to represent causal relations. Variables
and functional relations with these properties may manifest themselves at finer or coarser
grains. The appropriate level of grain at which to model a system is dependent upon the sort
of causal information one wishes to obtain by way of intervention. Likewise, whether a system
can be characterised at all as being constituted by causal relations will itself depend upon the
particular coarse-graining that is chosen, and we coarse grain as part of the modelling process
just so dynamical variables with the right sort of functional interrelationships can be objectified
for our practical purposes. Ultimately, though, the causal relations, according to Woodward,
are objective: “Relative to a specification of system and a level of description or graining for
it. . . once one fixes the variables one is talking about, it is [an] ‘objective’ matter whether and
how [the variables] are causally related” (Woodward, 2007, p.90). The core of the “objectivist
position regarding the connection between causality and agency” that Woodward (2003, p.125)
endorses is that “quite independently of our experience or perspective as agents, there is a
certain kind of relationship with intrinsic features that we exploit or make use of when we
bring about B by bringing about A”.
At least part of Woodward’s criticism of the agency account of Menzies and Price concerns
the fact that they “are not very forthcoming about just what is meant by their claims that
causation is [a secondary quality]” (Woodward, 2003, p.118). Price (2007) develops the notion
of causal perspectivalism to address this criticism, in which a more nuanced account of the
role of the agent in an interventionist account is developed (and where Price (2007, p.279)
claims that interventions themselves become a “Trojan Horse” for causal objectivists). Causal
perspectivalism claims that it is the distinction between cause and effect on an interventionist
account that can be reduced to an agent’s perspective: “the strong temporal asymmetry of
the notion of intervention—and hence, apparently, of our causal thinking in general—stems
not merely from the fact that we are agents, but also from a further contingency concerning
our temporal circumstances: above all, the strong temporal bias of our epistemic access to our
environment” (Price, 2007, p.280). Thus, when we approach, as human agents, a system on
which we wish to intervene, the causal relations that are exploitable by us are constrained by
our particular epistemic perspective (we have knowledge of the past, but not of the future).
Given this constraint, however, there is subsequently a fact of the matter—characterised in the
detail of Woodward’s interventionist account—concerning which relations are causal and which
are not. In this way, Woodward is correct to point out the objective nature of causal relations,
but this objectivity is dependent upon a particular perspective; one that happens to be stable
across human agents.
With this position in hand, Price (2014) goes on to argue that the supposed ‘objectivity’ of
Woodward’s version of interventionism and the supposed ‘subjectivity’ of agency accounts that
consider causation to be a secondary quality are really not such different accounts. Moreover,
the dependency of interventions on the agent perspective is not limited to the temporal bias
of our epistemic access to our environment. This is evident most prominently in the relativity
of invariance, stability, and modularity, and their connection to a choice of grain, which are all
perspectival, agent-dependent systematisations of the manipulable parts of the world. Relative
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to a specification into system and environment, and a level of description or grain, there is
a fact of the matter concerning what causes what. But this specification and level of grain
are agent-centric features of the causal model of some system. We can see in Price’s diagnosis
of the objectivity of interventionist causation the hallmark of perspectival objectivity: the
objectivity of causal relations is indexed to a perspective defined by the temporal embedding of
the intervening agent, as well as other agent-centric pragmatic constraints (like the specification
of a level-of-grain).
Ismael (2016) sharpens this debate (and provides a capstone of sorts) employing the notion
of ‘frame-dependency’ in our causal ascriptions on the world. The idea is that some aspects
of our causal ascriptions are frame-dependent, or perspectival, in the same way that, say,
temporal durations are frame-dependent according to relativity theory. However, and this is
part of Ismael’s rapprochement between the supposed ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ flavours of
interventionism, once we identify and discount any frame-dependency, we expect there to be
some invariant fundamental structure in the world that is independent of any perspective. This
‘modal substructure’, as Ismael (2016, p.258) calls it, comprises the objective relations that
we exploit when we intervene on the world; we partition the invariant structure into cause
and effect based on our idiosyncratic epistemic constraints and limitations concerning that
structure. It is thus perfectly reasonable to refer to some causal relation as objective, so long
as we understand such a claim in a deflationary, epistemic sense: there is a fact of the matter
about whether the relation is causal, but only given a separation of the system containing the
causal relation into system and environment and a level of grain of description that enables a
series of conditions that characterise causation to be met. Both the delineation into system
and environment and the level of grain of description are agent-centric specifications and are a
function of a particular epistemic perspective on the world. It is, as human agents, our shared
temporal orientation and shared physical capabilities as manipulators of the world that provide
our shared idiosyncratic epistemic constraints, and so ensures the intersubjective objectivity of
our causal claims. This provides us with the the perspectival objectivity of causality.
Armed with a more complete notion of perspectival objectivity, let us now turn our attention
to its application to quantum theory and consider Bohr’s quantum picture.
3 Bohr’s quantum picture
Recall that the task at hand is to suggest a possible philosophical foundation for the claims
that arise from the no-go theorems of §1.1 ruling out the possibility of observer-independent
facts. The tool that I develop in this work to address this is perspectival objectivity, whereby
some shared constraint amongst agents ensures the possibility of intersubjective objectivity
indexed to the agent perspective. My contention here is that this notion is sufficient to make
sense of observer-dependency by recasting it in terms of perspective-dependency, maintaining
objectivity—observer-independence—within a perspective. In this section I extend the discus-
sion to quantum theory, connecting perspectival objectivity to Bohr’s approach to quantum
theory. By way of contrast, first with Heisenberg, then with Einstein, I explore Bohr’s con-
ception of objectivity through his thoughts on ontic indeterminacy, physical reality, and com-
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plementarity, and argue that Bohr’s picture ensures the objectivity of quantum phenomena.6
In the next section, I relate Bohr’s conception of objectivity with my notion of perspectival
objectivity.
3.1 Ontic indeterminacy
Heisenberg developed the uncertainty principle that bears his name in 1926 while working at
Bohr’s institute in Copenhagen. The principle places a finite limit on the precision with which
conjugate variables can be simultaneously measured. While Heisenberg preferred an epistemic
understanding of the principle, Bohr developed his own understanding, preferring to refer to it
as the indeterminacy relation. Bohr’s indeterminacy relation is to be understood ontically, in
the sense that it is the world itself that is indeterminate, not merely our knowledge of it. As
Bohr (1928, p.582) argues:
The essence of [the indeterminacy relation] is the inevitability of the quantum postulate in the
estimation of the possibilities of measurement. A closer investigation of the possibilities of
definition would still seem necessary in order to bring out the general complementary character
of the description. Indeed, a discontinuous change of energy and momentum during obser-
vation could not prevent us from ascribing accurate values to the space-time co-ordinates, as
well as to the momentum-energy components before and after the process. The reciprocal
uncertainty which always affects the values of these quantities is. . . essentially an outcome of
the limited accuracy with which changes in energy and momentum can be defined. . .
The take-home message of this passage is that Bohr, in noting that an epistemic under-
standing of the uncertainty principle “could not prevent us from ascribing” precise values for
both position and momentum for some quantum system, prefers to understand the reciprocal
uncertainty as arising as “an outcome of the limited accuracy with which changes in energy and
momentum can be defined” (where a property is ‘defined’ when it has physical reality (Barad,
2007, p.127)). That is, it is the measurement conditions that define the ontic values of dy-
namical variables, and these values are indeterminate without specification of the measurement
conditions. We can think of these measurement conditions as themselves defined by, in the
first instance, scientific instruments, but also naturally extend this to encompass any external
system interacting with the quantum system of interest.
3.2 Physical reality
We can explore Bohr’s views on the nature of ‘physical reality’ through his response to the
argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) (EPR) regarding their ‘criterion of physical
reality’ (Bohr, 1935, p.700):
6I follow here the analysis of Barad (2007), who uses these considerations of Bohr’s quantum picture to de-
velop her own so-called ‘onto-epistemological’ position: agential realism. There are notable similarities between
agential realism and perspectival objectivity, not least the incorporation of agent-centric elements to ontology
and objectivity, respectively. One key difference, however, is that agential realism rejects the anthropocentrism
of Bohr’s quantum philosophy. Perspectival objectivity differs in emphasising the role of the human agent in
our scientific practice. Whereas Barad (2007) distances her view from the anthropocentric features of Bohr’s
view, I take these to be expressions of perspectival objectivity.
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From our point of view we now see that the wording of the above-mentioned criterion of
physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen contains an ambiguity as regards
the meaning of the expression “without in any way disturbing a system.” Of course there
is in a case like that just considered no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system
under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at
this stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which define
the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system. Since these
conditions constitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which
the term “physical reality” can be properly attached, we see that the argumentation of the
mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is
essentially incomplete.
In the last sentence of this passage, Bohr takes the term ‘physical reality’ to apply unam-
biguously (‘properly’) only to a phenomenon (Barad, 2007, p.274). For Bohr, a phenomenon
in quantum theory refers exclusively to observations obtained under specific experimental cir-
cumstances, where the interaction between the system and apparatus is an inseparable part of
the phenomenon (see, for instance, Bohr (1949, p.238) and Bohr (1958, p.4)). Thus, Bohr is
able to grant to Einstein et al. that, according to their argument, a lack of mechanical dis-
turbance of the system ensures the physical reality of the definite-valued measured properties,
which for Bohr are the ‘phenomena’. But for Bohr the completeness of the quantum mechanical
description does not necessarily imply a lack of physical reality of the phenomena. Since Bohr
takes “the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions”—that is, the experi-
mental conditions under which the particular phenomena arise—as an inseparable part of the
phenomena, the physical reality of the definite-valued measured properties can be influenced
without countenancing a mechanical disturbance, simply by changing the experimental condi-
tions. Thus Bohr grants the same ‘physical reality’ to the phenomena as do EPR while still
maintaining that the quantum mechanical description is complete. What is important for Bohr
is that, since the experimental conditions are an inherent element in defining the ontic values
of dynamical variables—that is, the phenomena—then the phenomena, and thereby physical
reality, are likewise conditionally defined by the experimental apparatus.
3.3 Separability, complementarity, and objectivity
As a result of the debate between Bohr and Einstein subsequent to the EPR argument and the
concerns about physical reality, Einstein expressed dismay that abandoning ‘separability’—“the
real in part of space A should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ independently of what is thought
of as real in space B” (Einstein et al., 1971, p.164, 31 March, 1948)—would be tantamount
to abandoning any possibility of objectivity. Here is Einstein recounting this sentiment in his
correspondence with Born in 1948 (Einstein et al., 1971, p.164, 31 March):
However, if one abandons the assumption that what exists in different parts of space has its
own, independent, real existence, then I simply cannot see what it is that physics is meant to
describe. For what is thought to be a ’system’ is, after all, just a convention, and I cannot
see how one could divide the world objectively in such a way that one could make statements
about parts of it.
This is important for Einstein since if one were not able to secure objectivity, then one
could not secure the possibility of scientific inquiry. Barad (2007, p.317–321) argues that the
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relationship between separability and objectivity is at the core of the debate between Bohr
and Einstein concerning the EPR argument. According to Barad, Bohr can indeed secure
objectivity in his quantum philosophy while simultaneously rejecting separability in favour of
an ontology of phenomena. These phenomena, constituted by coupled pairs of objects and
measurement conditions, “are the objective referent of measured properties. Complementarity
is an ontic (not merely an epistemic) principle” Barad (2007, p.309). Here is Bohr (1949,
p.217) commenting on his debate with Einstein on this topic:
This point is of great logical consequence, since it is only the circumstance that we are
presented with a choice of either tracing the path of a particle or observing interference effects,
which allows us to escape from the paradoxical necessity of concluding that the behaviour of
an electron or a photon should depend on the presence of a slit in the diaphragm through
which it could be proved not to pass. We have here to do with a typical example of how the
complementary phenomena appear under mutually exclusive experimental arrangements and
we are just faced with the impossibility, in the analysis of quantum effects, of drawing any sharp
separation between an independent behaviour of atomic objects and their interaction with the
measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena occur.
Thus, complementarity can secure objectivity: given some sufficiently defined measurement
conditions (or experimental arrangement), there is an objective fact of the matter concerning
the phenomena associated with those conditions. But rejecting separability raises a slightly
different concern for Bohr. As Barad (2007, p.320) puts it:
Einstein wants to know, if we give up on separability, what we should understand physics as
describing. Bohr had already answered: phenomena are what physics describes, not some
presumably independently existing object (which the failure of separability denies). Einstein
wants to know how the “observer” can then be differentiated from the “observed” such that
this individuation is made in an objective fashion.
For Bohr, all that is required for a differentiation between the measured object and measurement
device is a clear and reproducible record, determined by the experimental arrangement, of the
measurement device having acted upon (‘measured’) the object. Thus, there is a “measurement
of one part of the phenomenon by another part” (Barad, 2007, p.320). So long as the record
is clearly reproducible, in the sense that the same combination of system and measurement
conditions would share the same set of resulting phenomena, this record secures the objectivity
of the phenomena.
4 Perspectival objectivity in quantum mechanics
I claim that Bohr’s characterisation of objectivity is a kind of perspectival objectivity. The
parallels between the account of perspectival objectivity described above and Bohr’s character-
isation of objectivity in his quantum picture are stark. Both characterisations portray a kind of
conditional objectivity: given certain conditions, there is an objective fact of the matter about
some feature of the world. In the former case, the conditions consist in a particular agential
perspective on the world, and in the latter, the conditions consist in a particular experimental
arrangement. But, as argued in §1.2, instruments, and, by extension, experimental arrange-
ments, can also be understood as perspectival. Recall that we can understand the nature of
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the interaction between instrument and system as characterising a kind of ‘capability’ for the
instrument, and so it constrains the subset of variables to which the measured system can re-
spond, and thereby defines a perspective to which objective phenomena (given the experimental
arrangement) can be indexed. Thus, in so far as we can take an experimental arrangement to
provide a particular (albeit non-agential) perspective on some physical system (that may or
may not exhibit complementary phenomena), then we can take the objectivity of Bohr’s pic-
ture to be a kind of perspectival objectivity, where phenomena are objective indexed to an
experimental arrangement (observer-independent, but instrument-dependent, we might say).
Despite the fact that the kind of perspectival objectivity found in Bohr’s quantum picture is
non-agential, it would be wrong to think that it were not anthropocentric (contra Barad (2007)).
Indeed, what is an experimental arrangement if not anthropocentric? I have argued throughout
this work that, just like scientific instruments define a perspective, so too does our constrained
idiosyncratic capabilities to interact with, and model, reality define a perspective. In this con-
text, the interaction between an instrument and a system characterises a kind of ‘capability’
for the instrument by constraining the subset of variables to which the measured system can
respond. But we design and engineer scientific instruments to mesh with our perceptual capa-
bilities, thus we manufacture overlap between the ‘capabilities’ of our scientific instruments and
our idiosyncratic sensory contingencies. So in the quantum context, if a phenomenon for Bohr
is comprised of a ‘measuring’ part—that is, the experimental arrangement—and a ‘measured’
part, then, given these considerations, the experimental arrangement is specifically devised by
the agent to bring about the phenomenon in accordance with the idiosyncratic experiential fac-
ulties of that agent. (Recall the Giere quote from above: “an observer, whether a human or an
instrument, can interact with an object only from the observer’s own particular perspective”.)
This does not raise some novel quantum problem associated with observation, but is a
simple recognition that our observations are constrained to a set of variables matching our
perceptual capabilities, and our scientific instruments necessarily mediate our observations.
For human agents, the relevant phenomena consist mostly of visible indicators and audible
clicks in accordance with our idiosyncratic optical and aural faculties. In this sense, then, the
‘perspective’ of the experimental arrangement is anthropocentric in origin.7 (Of course, quite
trivially, we could not successfully arrange for a phenomenon to arise beyond our experiential
faculties, not least because it would be in principle unexperienceable. Some other class of agents
outside out own might very well be capable of interacting with and measuring quantum systems,
but any information they might gather is only useful to us in so far as it can be translated
into a form detectable by our idiosyncratic sensory contingencies.) Bohr was cognisant of this
agent-centric feature of a measuring apparatus, as shown in his example of a blind man using
a cane to explore a room (Bohr, 1929, p.485): the cane can be the object of sensation (when
explored itself by hand), or the mediator of sensation (when held tightly and extended towards
another body) where it serves as an extension of the agent’s experiential faculties.
Thus, I have argued that the perspective characterised by our constrained interaction capa-
bilities is an inescapable condition of worldly-directed human agency, and also underpins the
7I take this to be what Barad (2007, p.339) is getting at with the notion of ‘agential separability’, whereby
separability of some phenomenon into object and measuring device is relative to the specific phenomenon.
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design and implementation of our scientific instruments. The inescapability of the perspective
ensures intersubjective agreement between agents that share the perspective, and so there is
a perfectly reasonable sense of objectivity—that I have called perspectival objectivity—that
is available to underpin the possibility of objective scientific inquiry. In this and the previous
section I have mounted a case that Bohr’s quantum picture incorporates a type of perspectival-
ism, and a type of perspectival objectivity, and so ensures the objectivity of scientific inquiry
(and I take this to be an integral part of Bohr’s lifelong defence of his quantum picture). But
my motivation all along has been to attempt to accommodate the recent claims from quantum
foundations that quantum mechanics rules out the possibility of “observer-independent facts”.
By extending the notion of perspectivalism to generate a strongly qualified sense of observer-
independence, whereby facts about scientifically modelled objects are indexed to an observer
perspective, I suggest that these no-go theorems, rather than demonstrating the possibility
of observer-dependent facts, would be better understood as demonstrating the possibility of
perspective-dependent facts, which is a much easier pill to swallow, allowing for a notion of
observer-independence indexed to an agent perspective. Thus perspectival objectivity can en-
sure, despite the possibility of perspective-dependent scientific facts, the objectivity of scientific
inquiry. The task remains, then, to flesh out perspectival objectivity in quantum mechanics to
provide a more robust philosophical foundation for a perspective-dependent reality.
5 Future directions
There are challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for this analysis of the consequences of
the no-go theorems. Perhaps the biggest challenge relates to understanding what perspectival
objectivity means for a third-person description of the Wigner’s friend scenarios therein (or
if such a description remains possible at all). While I have argued that the objectivity of
scientific inquiry can be ensured on such a view, I have not attempted to provide an ontological
description of the experiment, realist or otherwise. It may be that such a task might lead one to
a kind of neo-Carnapian pragmatist approach to quantum ontology (not unlike the perspectival
normative realism of Glick (2018), developed from an analysis of the realist credentials of
quantum Bayesianism). Either way, this challenge requires further attention.
On a note of optimism, however, for the foundations of perspectival objectivity in quantum
mechanics, Karakostas and Zafiris (2018) set out a formal framework for understanding the in-
terrelation between the global structure of the set of phenomena associated with some quantum
system (the so-called quantum event algebra) and the set of local Boolean probing frames that
each arise as a result of a particular measurement perspective on the system. They argue, in
category theoretic terms, that this interrelation is underpinned by a bidirectional relation (‘cat-
egorical adjunction’) whereby the multilevel structure of interconnected local Boolean frames
encodes the global informational content of the quantum event algebra, and the quantum event
algebra formally decomposes via the action of Boolean probing frames into local perspectives
for the measurement of observables. Formally, then, a ‘quantum perspective’ is a complete
Boolean algebra of commuting projection operators generated by a set of mutually compatible
physical quantities (Karakostas and Zafiris, 2018, p.4).
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There are similarities between this formal framework and categorical approaches such as
Isham and Butterfield (1998); Do¨ring and Isham (2011); Abramsky and Brandenburger (2011)
and especially the ‘Bohrification’ programme of Heunen et al. (2011). The express difference
between these approaches and Karakostas and Zafiris is that Karakostas and Zafiris derive a
categorical adjunction to relate the local Boolean and global quantum structural level, which
conceptually and technically differentiates the approaches. Nevertheless, one might wonder
about the strength of the support that the formal framework of Karakostas and Zafiris lends to
perspectivalism given that these other categorical approaches seem able to formalise the interre-
lation between the non-commutative global structure of a quantum system and the commuting
sub-algebras of events that are measurable in experiments without recourse to the conceptual
machinery of perspectivalism. This, however, gets the strength of the claim I make in this
work wrong. I am not arguing for the necessity of perspectival objectivity in understanding
and interpreting measurement in quantum theory, nor do I take Karakostas and Zafiris (2018)
to have outlined a necessary interpretation of their categorical formalism. The intention in this
work is to suggest an albeit unorthodox proposal that is developed from an existing tradition of
perspectivalism in science and plausibly provides a way to understand the observer-dependent
facts of recent no-go theorems rather in terms of perspective-dependent facts, while maintain-
ing the observer-independence of scientific claims within the perspective. It is reason to be
optimistic for this proposal that the framework of Karakostas and Zafiris (2018) formally and
independently captures that a perspective arises from a particular experimental arrangement
applied to some quantum system. It remains to be seen how far this programmatic approach
can be pushed.
A further promising connection that could be made as a result of the above analysis concerns
the environment-induced selection of stable preferred-basis states as part of the decoherence
program. A foundational problem arises here from “the fact that the quantum-mechanical
measurement scheme. . . does not uniquely define the expansion of the postmeasurement state
and thereby leaves open the question of which observable can be considered as having been
measured by the apparatus” (Schlosshauer, 2005, p.1278). According to the environment-
induced selection account, sets of quantum states are selected as a preferred measurement basis
as a function of the interaction between system and environment, due to the stability of the
states in the face of interaction with the very many degrees of freedom in the environment.
This account relies on the fact that the decomposition of any state into system, apparatus, and
environment is always unique.8 But the uniqueness of decomposition does not by itself specify
preferred basis states, thus the account requires additional criteria to do so. I submit that the
sort of benign anthropocentrism that I have outlined in this work might provide grounds for
justifying the decomposition of system, apparatus, and environment pragmatically from agent-
centric principles, and moreover how our quantum descriptions select dynamical variables of a
sort that might be useful for classical agents such as ourselves. Exploring this connection looks
fruitful.
8This is called the tridecompositional uniqueness theorem. See (Schlosshauer, 2005, p.1278) and references
therein for further details. Although, see Donald (2004) for dissenting voice on the application of this theorem
in this context.
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Finally, and perhaps most promisingly, it seems an interesting task to explore how per-
spectival objectivity could provide a philosophical foundation for relational quantum mechan-
ics (Rovelli, 1996) (and perhaps also its relation to ‘participatory realism’ in the context of
quantum Bayesianism (Fuchs, 2017)). Relational quantum mechanics is explicitly observer de-
pendent, where an ‘observer’ is taken to be any physical system interacting with the system of
interest. By incorporating the sort of perspectivalism I espouse in this work, one can ensure
the observer-independence of relational quantum states.
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